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Abstract 
 This study aims at examining the framing of crises threatening the security and welfare of 
Egypt embodied in the ongoing terrorism and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD) that will drastically decrease the country's water share. The samples 
are derived from social media, specifically Facebook and Twitter, as well as online publications. 
The nine political Facebook pages selected are among the top 100 in Egypt in terms of followers. 
The three publications are chosen to reflect the type of ownership which varies from state-owned 
to privately-owned including partisan publications. The Tweets were picked according to 
hashtags of incidents that occurred within the time frame extending from September 2017 till 
March 2018. Those tweets had to be by citizen users and not professional publications or public 
figures. The study looks into types of frames, and stereotypical frames, as well as, rumors 
promoted to be bases for determining the master and tactical frames adopted by each political 
group on each topic. The theoretical framework is Framing Theory, Public Sphere Theory and 
Two-step-flow Theory. The research method used is content analysis to study social media posts, 
tweets, and online publications’ op-eds collected through purposive sampling. For terrorism, the 
time frame included three major terror attacks publicly known as the Rawda Mosque Attack in 
North Sinai, the Wahat Incident, and Helwan Church. As for the Ethiopian dam, the time frame 
consisted of failure in technical negotiations throughout different rounds, and a great progress in 
the dam's construction. The research at hand draws a clear image of the dominant frames adopted 
by different political groups, and to what extent stereotypical frames and rumors were deployed 
to communicate different messages serving the master and tactical frames such groups adopt. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: 
 
Since 2011, Egypt has been struggling with two major nation-widecrisis framed as 
imminent threats. One is terrorism, and the other is a dam being built in Ethiopia and that would 
affect the country's historic water share, which is already insufficient due to overpopulation. As 
the Egyptian population surpassed 100 million, Egypt needs 114 billion cubic meters to become 
water self-sufficient (Mosaad, 2018). Egypt's share of Nile water remained at 55 billion cubic 
meters since the population was just 20 million. The current annual consumption is 80 billion 
cubic meters with a water deficit of 20 billion cubic meters as Egypt harnesses 4.5 billion cubic 
meters of rain and underground water.  The annual increase in birth rate is 2.5 million so as the 
population is expected to be 170 million by 2030 (Mosaad, 2018). The agriculture of wheat, 
beans, and oil plants consumes 34 billion cubic meters of water. Water scarcity led to the 
importation of 12 million tons of wheat per year.  
 
Egypt has been part of 18 rounds of talks and negotiations pertinent to the construction 
technicalities of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) but no progress has been 
achieved. Constructions in the Grand Renaissance Dam started on April 2, 2011 at a cost of $4.8 
billion. The dam is located on the Blue Nile with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, and is 
expected to generate up to 6,000 megawatts of power (El Tawil, 2017). Since May 2011, Cairo 
has voiced its concern over how the dam can reduce the country’s annual share of Nile water. 
Egypt’s average water per-capita is expected to drop from 663 cubic meters per year to 582 cubic 
meters by 2025, according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
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(CAPMAS) in 2014. Addis Ababa, however, claimed that the dam is necessary for its 
development and will not harm downstream countries. 
  
Terrorism has claimed the lives of thousands of security personnel, and civilians and 
caused the destruction of dozens of vehicles and property. From 2013 through 2015, 214 
electricity towers were blown up costing the state LE150 million (Gomaa, 2017). Between 
December 2013 and December 2016, terror attacks caused 588 deaths among civilians. From 
December 2016 till November 2017, terror attacks in Egypt incurred 507 deaths among civilians, 
while 76 percent of terror attacks in North Sinai targeted security forces resulting in 292 deaths. 
In addition, 396 civilians were killed in North Sinai during the same period increasing the death 
toll from 446 in 2016 to almost 700 in 2017 in that particular governorate (Gomaa, 2017).  
 In the aftermath of the overthrowing of former President Mohamed Morsi, who is 
affiliated with the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, the financial losses in North Sinai 
between July 2013 and September 2013 recorded LE33.5 million due to setting 55 state-owned 
vehicles on fire and other vandalism and robbery acts (Ashtewy, 2013). In 2015, the economic 
losses reached LE50 billion in the sectors of energy, transportation, and tourism – which is a key 
industry in the country - as a result of 2,533terror attacks that also incurred 756 deaths and 1,433 
injuries (Abdel Hafiz, 2016).  Tourism, which provides employment for three million 
Egyptianswith investments of LE500 billion, has yielded $70 billion of losses since 2011 till 
2016 (Shawky, 2016). Although, the security bodies have succeeded in the last couple of years in 
limiting terror attacks to North Sinai so as their numbers dropped drastically in other 
governorates, Egypt is still fighting terrorism and still holds the war against terrorism.   
11 
 
As social media have been increasingly a platform for the public to express their opinion, 
and for mainstream media to reach some segments of their target audiences, the thesis would 
study how both topics are tackled by regular users on Facebook, Twitter, and by three 
publications online. 
 
1.1- Significance of the study 
  
Asthe two-step-flow theorysuggests, opinions leaders are more influential than 
professional media (katz, 1957). Those individuals constitute a part of the public sphere shaping 
public opinion. Currently, new media is considered to possess the same function and 
characteristics of Jurgen Habermas’ public sphere (Mahlouly, 2013) 
 
Since the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak, social media have been playing 
a major role in influencing younger generations' political views as well as mainstream 
media(Jebril& Loveless, 2017; Youssef, Arafa, & Kumar, 2014; Lim, 2012; Aref, 2013; Ali & 
Fahmy, 2013; Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey, 2013; Cherkaoui, 2017; Iskander, 2011; El-
Hibri, 2014; Soukup, 2018; Mustafa, 2015). The mass communication studies conducted during 
that period focused on the political shifts that occurred due to overthrowing two presidents 
giving rise to two stormy transitional periods the studies were mainly linked to democracy, and 
freedoms (Jebril& Loveless, 2017; Youssef, Arafa, & Kumar, 2014; Lim, 2012; Aref, 2013; Ali 
& Fahmy, 2013; Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey, 2013; Cherkaoui, 2017; Iskander, 2011; El-
Hibri, 2014; Soukup, 2018; Mustafa, 2015). According to a 2016 report titled “Egypt returning to 
stability” by Oxford Business Group, Egypt is currentlyconsidered transitional democracy, and 
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has been achieving stability. However, such stability and economic reforms might be jeopardized 
by the impact of terrorism and GERD. This research focuses on how citizens on social media and 
columnists in online publications perceive and frame such crises. 
 
1.2- Objective of the study: 
  
The study examines the content of the top nine political Facebook pages in Egypt in 
terms of number of followers, tweets with significant hashtags to the time frame, and op-eds on 
terrorism and GERD in online Arabic-language state-owned, privately-owned, and partisan 
newspapers. The study analyzes how different groupsdefine,and perceive such crises, as well as, 
the magnitude of stereotypes and rumors used in their discourse. That is in addition to examining 
if the presence of such crises are linked to calls for participating or boycotting 2018 Presidential 
Election which took place within the study’s time frame, and whereas incumbent President 
Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi was re-elected.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework is framing and public sphere theories. Frames are ‘persistent 
patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion by 
which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse’ (Gamson, & Modigliani, 1989). Framing 
theory was developed by sociologist Erving Goffman, in his book ‘Frame Analysis: An Essay on 
the Organization’ published 1974. 
 
The concept of framing is "seen as rendering what would have been otherwise a 
meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful" (Goffman, 1974). Goffman's 
aim is "to systemize the range of options that are available to persons for defining a situation and 
their relations to it" (Ytreberg, 2002).   
 
The frame analysis is intertwined with other developments in the social theory such as 
social constructionism defined as "an overarching perspective on contemporary social orders" 
(Kent & Davis, 2006). "Communication is essential to the construction, maintenance of and 
changes in social order since it is the means by which meaning is negotiated and assigned to 
objects, persons and events in the social world" making up the reality of the social order (Kent & 
Davis, 2006).  
 
According to Goffman, "frames are implicit and underlie all types of social activity" 
(Kent & Davis, 2006). Thus, individuals need to learn the frames that structure social activities in 
order to understand and participate in them. Frames also guide people on what to think about, 
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and not just what to think. The scholar observed that most news is about frame violations making 
up newsworthy events.  
 
When journalists report the events deviating from normality they implicitly guard the 
status quo, especially is that coverage is coupled with shedding light on how elites restore order. 
James Carey (1989) argues that such coverage always provides ritualized messages of 
reassurance.  
 
Framing research showcases that it is often hard for journalists to challenge the status and 
quo and the governing elites because consumers are more prone to favor such reassuring 
messages. Herbert Gans (1979) contends that journalists tend to "most effectively present the 
perspective of the upper-middle-class professional strata and to defend this class against social 
strata above it and below it" (Kent & Davis, 2006). 
 
The framing theory gained popularity in journalism studies in the 1980s and the 1990s so 
that prominent scholars that added to it at the time were sociologists Todd Gitlin (1980) and 
Gaye Tuchman (1978). The former studied news coverage of "politically radical groups in the 
1960s highlighting how they were "systematically presented in ways that demeaned their 
activities and ignored their ideas" (Kent & Davis, 2006). 
 
The latter focused on detecting the limitations of strategies deployed in routine news 
coverage work causing the elimination of events' ambiguity and instead reinforcing "socially 
accepted and expected" perceptions of the social world. Another well-known framing scholar is 
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William Gamson (1991) who "has traced the success and failure of social movements in 
promoting frames consistent with their ideological interests" (Kent & Davis, 2006). Gamson 
argues that frames used in public discourse serve the interests of those who develop and promote 
them.  
 
Other scholars like Robert Entman highlighted how governments and corporations 
employ public relations staff to provide for mass media material framed in ways that serve their 
interests maintaining and extending their control over the social world (Kent & Davis, 2006).  
 
The public sphere theory was developed by Jurgen Habermas in 1962, and it is a sphere 
between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of the public opinion. 
Neidhardt (1994) contends that "public communication emerges wherever a speaker cannot 
control the boundaries of his audience" (koller, 2007). Therefore, "the openness to strangers 
(Warner, 2002 & Calhoun, 2003) represents the central conceptual feature of the public sphere" 
(Koller, 2007).   
 
Public communication takes place in the public sphere "as a product of coordinated 
action by actors from all societal fields, especially from the political field, the economic field and 
the media field, but also from the academic field, the religious field and the art field" (Koller, 
2007).  Different arenas in the public sphere would always be connected regardless of any 
internal divisions due to "streams of communication" it contains (Habermas, 1996 & Imhof, 
2005). Pierre Bourdieu (1998) defined the public sphere as the encompassing "field of power."At 
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firsthe attached the field of power to the ruling or dominant class but later identified it as a 
relational product of all fields.  
 
Earlier studies of the dominant public sphere had overlooked the dynamics with its 
periphery, although focused on its structures. That led to the introduction of the counterpublic 
sphere concept (Negt/Kluge, 1993; Fraser, 1992; Asen, 2000; &Warner, 2002) which was later 
adopted by Habermas. "The counterpublic sphere represents dissident networks of 
communication whose communication streams are (currently) not diffusing into the dominant 
public sphere" (Keller, 2007). 
 
The two-step-flow theory was developed by sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld in 1944 
suggesting in his book ‘The People’s Choice’ that ideas often flow from mass media to opinion 
leaders and from these to the less active sections of the population (Katz, 1957). Katz (1957) 
identified three main aspects of the theory derived from public opinion studies conducted in 
times of elections. Those are the impact of personal influence; the flow of personal influence; 
and the relationship of opinion leaders to the mass media. 
 
For the impact of personal influence, a 1940 studyindicates that personal influence 
affected voting decisions more than mass media did. Different studies demonstrate that opinion 
leaders in primary groups – meaning they have close ties with individuals they influence – are 
much more influential, and that personal influence is non-purposive, flexible, and trustworthy. 
As such, personal influence plays an informing role unlike professional media that plays a 
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legitimizing role reinforcing and strengthening predispositions and decisions already taken 
(Katz, 1957).  
 
As for the flow of personal influence, a 1940 voting study shows that opinion leaders are 
not concentrated in the upper brackets of the society but are “located in almost equal proportions 
in every social group and stratum” (Katz, 1957). Finally, the relationship of opinion leaders to 
the mass mediaaspect “states that opinion leaders are more exposed to the mass media than those 
whom they influence” (Katz, 1957). 
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Chapter 3: Review of Literature 
 
Multiple studies have covered the role of opinion leaders in the public sphere as well as 
framing types and categories used. As this study is concerned with identifying the frameworks of 
op-eds and social media posts, the literature is divided as following: framing, significance of 
social media, and background on crises impacting Egypt’s national security epitomized in 
terrorism and GERD. 
 
3.1- Framing:  
 
Psychologist David J. Schneider (2004) suggested three basic features of stereotypes that 
distinguish them from ordinary generalizations. The first is that stereotypes are formed based 
upon "insufficient information" despite of containing "kernels-of-truth." That's because the 
process of stereotyping attributes a bunch of features to an entire group disregarding individual 
differences.  
 
Second, when holding a stereotype toward a group, people are less likely to rely on 
objective experience than on culture. That makes stereotypes more rigid and resistant to change. 
Third, stereotypes are often rooted in culture, and are common within groups.  
In mass communication, "stereotypical frames" coupled with their "potential cognitive and 
affective effects" constitute "genres of media frames" which can be assessed through content 
analysis of media messages (Yang, 2015). 
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Commonly used themes in framing include emphasizing the conflict, an emotional aspect 
of the story, and the grim economic consequences (Entman, 1993; Severin & Tankard, 2001). 
Such frames can promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, or moral 
evaluation (Entman, 1993) and thus influence debates and structure the political outcomes 
(Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).  
 
A study titled 'Nigeria as a country of interest in terrorism' used framing analysis to 
determine how four Nigerian newspapers framed an aborted suicide attack on a US-bound 
aircraft on Christmas Day in 2009. It revealed that perpetrator is a product of "alien cultural and 
religious values" and that radicalization and Islamic extremism are not common in Nigeria unlike 
other countries (Ette, 2012). 
 
A study, conducted by Naila Hamdy and Ehab H. Gomaa (2012), depicts how the 
January 25 Revolution was framed in state-owned and independent newspapers as well as how it 
was framed in Facebook posts on "We are all Khaled Saeed" page, Tweets having the hashtag 
"#Thawra#jan25," and blog posts from popular Egyptian  political blogs. The dominant frame in 
each media set was indicated in the study as well as the definition of the problem, diagnosis of 
the reason, and suggested solutions.  
 
A study conducted by Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vreese(1999) depended on 
identifying the conflict frame, the responsibility frame, the economic consequences frame, and 
the human interest frames to examine readers' thoughts about and recall of two issues. 
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Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro (2015) included in analysis of Vancouver riots tweets 
descriptors, themes, and frames of the tweets. Focused coding was deployed to develop the 
themes as it identifies the most frequent or reoccurring codes to construct the salient categories 
within content (Saldana, 2009; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 2015).  
 
Lastly, the qualitative coding methodology of axial coding was employed as an extension 
of focused coding, and further reduced and regrouped data into frames based upon similar 
dimensions or properties (Saldana, 2009; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 2015).  
The frames were indicative of broad conceptual categories that provided culturally specific 
meaning to the reader (Goffman, 1974; Zaharopoulos, 2007; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 
2015). 
 
The framing of an event or issue is a critical act by which we organize, categorize, and 
solve situations. Frames are publicly presented definitions of a situation containing three 
elements: a problem, a protagonist, and a solution (Levin, 2005). Humans subconsciously 
incorporate framing into nearly every communicative act (Goffman, 1974).  
 
Social organizations utilize frames for four critical group maintenance functions: (a) 
identity (social organization/allies/opposition) definition, (b) problem definition, (c) solution 
definition, and (d) engendering motivation from the social organization and its allies to act to 
solve the problem with the solution proposed (Snow & Benford, 1988; Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 
1994).  
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From framing perspective, "social organizations are a vehicle for expression of collective 
identity, a worldview of how the individual relates to various social groups and events," (Levin, 
2005). Snow and Benford (1992) call this worldview a master frame. "A master frame structures 
the way in which its adherents process information coming from the environment and the manner 
in which they disseminate information to others," (Levin, 2005). 
 
Starting the 1990s, "the RMT, PPA, and framing perspectives have been increasingly 
synthesized to allow researchers to assert how frames are used by competing social movement 
organizations" (Levin, 2005). Chong (1996, 2000) suggests that "master frames are what 
political entrepreneurs use to convince citizens that the cost-benefit calculation comes down in 
favor of mobilization and not inaction" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"Chong presents a model of group identity and value formation in which rational political 
entrepreneurs seek to create social organizations by melding together material and social 
incentives with prior culturally salient norms and values while operating under the constraints of 
various laws and competition from other social actors" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"The norms and values are rooted in the society's development of rules of the game the 
social interactions patterns that humans develop in order to add structure and regularity to social 
interaction (Lane, 1992; Migdal, 1988)," (Levin, 2005). 
 
"In Chong's (2000) rational actor model, transformation of social values through 
instrumental selection and manipulation of frames is an iterative and gradual process wherein the 
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entrepreneur's ability to frame is bound by prior social norms and current political opportunities" 
(Levin, 2005). Chong's work synthesizes the current RMT, PPA, and framing perspectives to 
show how social organizations employ master frames. 
 
These are both research questions asked by David Levin in the article titled "Framing 
Peace Policies." "First, since competing social movement organizations clearly act strategically 
in relation to political opportunity structures, do they also adopt framing tactics to suit the 
political opportunity structures they confront?" (Levin, 2005)."Second, do social movement 
organizations pay attention to the cultural resonance between a particular theme and recent 
events'?" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"The primary task of a tactical frame is to demonstrate to the public that the social 
organization's master frame is the best definition of the reality that society is facing," (Levin, 
2005)."Master frames do not decide who has the right to frame (a master frame by 
definitionpresumes that the social organization's own frame is the correct definition of the 
situation)," (Levin, 2005). 
 
The tactical frames' consequences are: (a) directly respond to (not reshape) the conditions 
(political opportunity structures) immediately confronting the social organization'; (b) short-term 
effects (Levin, 2005). "Their purpose is to rally activists and allies behind the master frame in the 
face of competition from other social actors" (Levin, 2005). 
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"The role of the tactical frame thus defines the options available to a social organization," 
(Levin, 2005). A social organization confronted with competition has a choice between four 
tactical options: denial (fight), end run (innovate), incorporation (cooperate or symbiosis), and 
silence (flight) which is the absence of framing (Levin, 2005).  
 
This typology of tactical frames is a micro-level reflection of three of the four master 
frame alignment processes described by Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986): 
transformation, amplification, and extension (Levin, 2005).  
 
Denial 
 
"Denial tactical frames are primarily a response to real world events that have a prima 
facie interpretation threatening the values and logic that the social organization cherishes" 
(Levin, 2005). "Denial tactical frames claim that the values and logic of the competing actors are 
so fundamentally flawed that any serious consideration of their arguments is unnecessary."  
 
"The typical denial tactical frame asserts that the values of the other side(s) are invalid. 
Occasionally, denial frames will also assert that even if the premises of the competing actors are 
sound, their conclusions are invalid. Thus, denial frames tend to be ideological arguments with 
an emphasis on appeals to strongly held values that provoke quick (often subconscious) reactions 
by observers" (Levin, 2005).  
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"In the sense that denial frames represent a defensive act to hold on to a particular master 
frame (worldview), they are the reverse image of a micro application of Snow et al.'s (1986) 
frame transformation, the process whereby new master frames gain ascendance over competing 
interpretations of events and experiences" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"The primary audience of denial frames is the social core constituency. Denial frames are 
defensive acts, not attempts to reach new constituents. Denial frames are most likely to be used 
by social organizations at or near the center of the political spectrum or advantaged by social 
norms" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"This is for two reasons: First, the social organization's arguments must be well known, if 
not universally accepted, by its constituents, and second, social organizations that espouse 
majoritarian values have more to lose if these values become pushed to the periphery than social 
organizations that espouse peripheral values do" (Levin, 2005).  
 
End Run 
 
"End run frames are attempts to gain ground by reaching out to potential constituents. 
End run tactical frames claim that new considerations are necessary in making a decision on a 
policy. They are a real world application of Schattschneider's (I960) strategy of creating new 
cleavages" (Levin, 2005).  
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"End run tactical frames do not deny the validity of prior values and considerations. Rather, they 
suggest that older considerations need to be reweighted within a larger constellation of values. 
End run frames are generally an appeal to a value system couched in the frame of a logical 
argument" (Levin, 2005). 
 
"In this sense, they are very similar to Snow et al.'s (1986) frame amplification: the 
clarification and invigoration of how an interpretive master frame bears on a set of issues. Social 
organizations that use end run tactical frames are at a relative disadvantage" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"They have to make clear two ideas: (a) how the new considerations relate to the policy 
or issue in dispute and (b) why the new considerations should take priority over the old 
considerations. This means that in order to be successful, end run frames require a favorable 
balance of current events that support the internal logic of the frame" (Levin, 2005). 
Incorporation 
 
"Incorporation frames attempt to cut off the source of public support for other actors by 
including the values voiced by other actors in the incorporation frame. If successful, this forces 
the other actors to search for new values and issues to mobilize around. Incorporation frames 
acknowledge the validity and hierarchy of value claims made by other social actors" (Levin, 
2005).  
 
"However, these frames assert that the values a social organization holds in common with 
other social organizations originate from the social organization itself, not from some other 
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organization. Snow et al. (1986) refer to this process at the master frame level as frame 
extension" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"The primary difference between frame extension and incorporation is the frame level. 
Both frame extension and incorporation seek to maximize the reach of the social organization by 
portraying the organization's values as congruent with values of persons not yet in the social 
organization" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"Beyond the level of the frame, where extension and incorporation differ is in the 
competitive nature of the act. Frame extension does not necessarily try to cut off support for 
other public actors, while incorporation is an act done in a more zero-sum environment of frame 
competition" (Levin, 2005). 
 
"Incorporation frames tend to stress one of two elements: majoritarian values or the status 
of the social organization as representing "the public," or at least "the public on one entire side of 
the issue" (Levin, 2005).  
 
"Truly large actors, such as governments, use incorporation frames to demobilize social 
movements" (Levin, 2005). "Social movements use incorporation frames usually as a last ditch 
attempt to retain a foothold on an issue already being acted upon by the government."  
 
"The success of incorporation framing depends on how much larger or smaller an actor is 
compared to its competitor(s) and the degree of positive media coverage the actor has relative to 
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its competitor(s). The larger the social organization and the more positive the coverage, the more 
successful the incorporation framing attempt is likely to be" (Levin, 2005). 
 
Context specific meanings of frames emerging within groups, cultures, and situations are 
important to understand how master frames organize social movement activity (Porter 
&Hellsten, 2014). Snow (2004) suggests that master frames change as groups (re)constitute the 
target of their activity in light of the new events occurring in the world.  
 
Collective action framing is an ‘‘active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency 
and contention at the level of reality construction’’ (Snow & Benford, 1992). Specifically, 
collective action framing describes a process of forming positions on an issue of concern through 
different discourses that call others to action (Porter & Hellsten, 2014). In social movement 
research, collective action framing has been shown to garner support for causes and demobilize 
antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1992).  
 
3.2- Significance of Social Media: 
 
Homero Gil de Zúñiga and James H. Liu conducted a study in 2017 on dual screening 
which is when recipients resort to social media to discuss and know more on information and 
messages delivered by mainstream media, especially television, almost concurrently with 
consuming the original message. The study adopted the survey method in 22 countries.  
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The study examined whether there was a relation between second screening on one hand, 
and social media political expression, political participation, and voting on the other hand.  It 
indicated that second screening is directly related to social media political expression, and offline 
political participation. On the other hand, results varied as there was not a significant relationship 
between second screening and voting in ten countries, while there was direct and inverse 
relationships in others.  
 
Second screening shapes the masses' perception of journalists, political figures and 
entities (Chadwick, O’Loughlin, & Vaccari,2017), and plays a role in promoting a discursive 
public sphere with space open to political persuasion, probably due to people getting exposed to 
newfangled information and ideas (Barnidge, Gil de Zúñiga, & Diehl, 2017).  
 
Social media provide content from alternative sources to those common in mainstream 
media (Littler & Feldman, 2017). Littler and Feldman conducted a study in 2017 to examine how 
social media have become a platform for populist political figures to voice their ideas and 
stances avoiding the "cordon sanitaire."   
 
The study focused on testing the relationship between social media usage and concern 
about populist political issues. The hypothesis was that those reporting Facebook and Twitter 
usage will be more likely to show concern about immigration. The methodology was regression 
analysis using data from the face-to-face survey portion of the 2015 British Election Study. 
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Although the research did not support the hypothesis, the result can be an indicator that 
participation in the digital community can help demoting the prevalence of radical ideas through 
its “pluralisation of the public space,” according to Dahlgren (2005).  
 
The pluralization concept raises doubt on literary works on digital extremist communities 
suggesting that the adoption and entrenchment of extremist attitudes increases with greater 
online participation (Wojcieszak 2010). 
 
Some scholars argue that social media either decreases or have no effect on civic 
engagement. Heavy users of social media are less likely to be engaged in civil matters (Kraut et 
al., 1998; Nie, 2001), and those politically engaged in social media are those who are originally 
interested in politics and do participate in real life (Norris, 2001).  
 
Nir (2011) suggests that heterogeneous discussion may have two definitions. One is 
competition between points of view. The other is the opposition to another's view. In terms of 
network heterogeneity, competition means an array of divergent viewpoints within a given 
network (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Nir, 2005). On the other hand, opposition is understood 
from the perspective of ego position as a divergence between the preference of the ego position 
and all other discussants in the network (Mutz, 2006). 
 
As social media has arguably created a different form of public sphere from the one 
created by mainstream media as users create the content, Rasmussen (2013) suggests that the 
rationale behind people's decision has become more complicated to understand.  
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However, social media are still a platform that is similar to the ideal public sphere 
Habermas describes as independent from the influence and power of political elites which used 
to have better access to traditional media.  
 
A number of scholars perceive the Internet as not creating enough of the type of rational, 
deliberative debate between citizens and political actors to be considered a public sphere (Gil De 
Zuniga, 2015).  
 
However, new media gave rise to a “public space” that enables access to information as 
well as discussion and engagement in public affairs without fulfilling the democratic objectives 
of the public sphere (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013; Papacharissi, 2010).  
 
A comparison conducted by Saldaña, McGregor, and Gil de Zúñiga studying political 
social media use by citizens in the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrated that the 
free and open political discussion empowered by social media form a base for promoting 
informed public opinion which a "benchmark" for public sphere (Gil De Zuniga, 2015).  
 
Those scholars view social media as a "marketplace of ideas" giving exposure to different 
networks of people offering new and complementary ideas, and encouraging political discussion 
and thus political mobilization.  
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A framing analysis assumed by Muñiz, Alvídrez, and Téllez showed that sometimes the 
public's online discussions are aligned with mainstream media's frame, while in some other 
times, they adopt independent frames (Gil De Zuniga, 2015). "Although the media does affect 
the nature of online political discussions, the public still retains autonomy in the way they debate 
politics," (Gil De Zuniga, 2015). 
 
Social media has been playing a role in determining the story covered and tackled by 
mainstream media, which has pushed scholars to conduct intermedia agenda-setting by studying 
a social medium and a given mainstream medium. In 2007, Wallsten analyzed blogs and online 
discussions, and determinedan immediate mutual agenda-setting influence between blogs and 
The New York Times. In 2008, Kushin determined an agenda-setting influence by Twitter over 
the same publication.  
 
Another study by Ku, Kaid and Pfau (2003) indicated that new media set the agenda for 
traditional media. On the other hand, Sweetser et al. (2008) concluded that broadcast media have 
an agenda-setting influence over blogs. Gizem Melek conducted a study in 2017 to examine 
intermedia agenda-setting between the online version of the most circulated newspaper in Turkey 
Hurriyet and Twitter as Turkish media faces censorship. The hypothesis was not supported. 
However, an insignificant agenda-setting influence by Twitter on Hurriyet was detected.  
 
Gillmor (2006) suggests that social media ensure that a large variety of ideas and 
unfiltered opinions are available in the public sphere. Larsson and Moe (2014) demonstrate that 
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regular citizens have the opportunity of getting the content they create shared and retweeted 
more than public figures. 
 
A case in point is citizen journalism manifested during the April 2013 Boston marathon-
attack whereas imagery taken by regular citizens became much more widespread that 
mainstream news photography (Allan, 2014).By contrast, some scholars, such as (Cammaerts, 
2008), argue that socio-economic elites that dominate mainstream media continue to be powerful 
in new media.  
 
Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao (2016) did content analysis of tweets to determine the 
amount of rumors circulated during Korean saber rattling 2013. Rumors are part of public 
opinions whose traits are:  
 
"First, public opinions are composed of responses from citizens as opposed to 
governmentorganizations; second, they are publicly expressed, collective opinions as opposedto 
private conversations; and third, public opinions are relevant to public affairs, withpotential 
influence on political decision-making (Herbst, 1991; Peterson & Gist, 1951;Price, 1988; Speir, 
1950)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016). 
 
"Polling is an institutionalized construction of public opinions that mainly aims for social 
control and surveillance (Bishop, 2004; Blumer, 1948) and is often mistaken for a true 
representation of collective minds (Moore, 2008; Stromback, 2012)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and 
Rao, 2016). 
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"In contrast to research that equates ‘public opinion’ and ‘polling,’ some scholars view 
rumors as an alternative form of public opinions. For example, Rosnow (1988) defines rumors as 
‘public communications that reflect private hypotheses about how the world works" (Kwon, 
Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016). 
 
"According to Peterson and Gist (1951), rumors should be considered as special cases of 
public opinions because rumors are more ‘affect-laden’ collective responses than polling, which 
manifest ‘expectations, fears, anxieties, hostilities, and aspirations’" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and 
Rao, 2016). 
 
Critical situations, such as disasters, riots or warfare, make fertile environment for rumors 
(Allport& Postman, 1947; Lee, Agrawal, & Rao, 2015). Rumors circulation can play a role in 
consensus building by making people feel they are obtaining additional information reducing 
their uncertainty (Oh et al., 2013).   
 
"From this consensus-building approach, the rumor-milling phase ultimately progresses 
into what Turner and Killian (1987) refer to as the ‘keynoting’ phase where collective definitions 
of crises are reached and collective behaviors are initiated" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 
2016). 
 
"In contrast to the consensus-building approach, conflict-inflicting approach suggests that 
rumors potentially cause conflict on intergroup relations and increase prejudice and 
discrimination, deteriorating consensus-building efforts (Knopf, 1975)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, 
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and Rao, 2016). Rumors are categorized into two main themes. One is intergroup hostility and 
prejudice. The other is citizens' mistrust toward the elites (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016). 
 
Knapp (1944) classifies crisis-related rumors into three types: pipedream (rumors 
aboutwished-for outcomes), bogie (rumors about dreadful consequences), and wedge-
driving(WD) (group divisive rumors with aggression). They may be distinguishable but 
notnecessarily exclusive from each other(Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).  
 
"A WDR is an unverified proposition toned with derogation, blame, or attack toward a 
specific target group (or individuals representative of the group) that is not a direct cause of the 
problem (e.g. Allport & Postman, 1947; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Garrett, 2011)" (Kwon, Bang, 
Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).  
 
"Like other types of rumors (e.g. pipedream and bogie), a WDR transmission is 
motivated by the desire to understand and interpret uncertain situations with causal attributions. 
WDR, however, poses greater sociopolitical consequences than other types in that it is closely 
linked to intergroup conflict" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016). 
 
"Self-defense is an underlying trigger of WDRs: by putting others down, threatened 
individuals release anxiety and enhance a sense of positive self-identity (DiFonzo& Bordia, 
2007). According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Hovland& Sears, 1940), uncertain 
crisis situations induce frustration to which individuals respond by displaying aggression toward 
out-group members and by scapegoating them" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).  
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For a tweet content to be categorized as a rumor, it had to have two characteristics. One is 
"information ambiguity" which is lacking attribution to a verifiable source. The other is 
"proposition" so as the tweet refers to a person, object, situation and not an idea or theory.  
 
3.3- Terrorism and Ethiopian Dam Crises:  
 
The main pressing national security issues that have been the focus of public discourse in 
Egypt have been terrorism and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam for its 
suspected harmful effects on Egypt's water share of the Nile River and water security. The roots 
of the issues go back to the year of the revolution in 2011.  
 
3.3.1- Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
 
Constructions in the Grand Renaissance Dam started on April 2, 2011 at a cost of $4.8 
billion. It was built by the Italian construction and engineering company Salini Impergilo. The 
Italian company is headquartered in Milan. The dam is located on the Blue Nile with a capacity 
of 74 billion cubic meters, and is expected to generate up to 6,000 megawatts of power (El 
Tawil, 2017).  
 
Since May 2011, Cairo has voiced its concern over how the dam can reduce the country’s annual 
shares of more than 56 billion cubic meters of Nile water. Egypt’s average water per-capita is 
expected to drop from 663 cubic meters per year to 582 cubic meters by 2025, according to the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in 2014. Addis Ababa, 
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however, claimed that the dam is necessary for its development and will not harm downstream 
countries.  
 
Meanwhile, President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi signed a tripartite joint cooperation agreement in 
Khartoum on March 23, 2015 between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. In December 2015, Sisi 
addressed the public, saying that there is no reason to worry about the dam and that the matter 
would be resolved. The three countries held 14 rounds of consultation on resolving the disputes 
over the Renaissance Dam. However, these rounds failed to solve the dispute (El Tawil, 2017).  
 
Former Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hossam el-Moughazi stated in 
November 2015 that the dam’s construction is going faster than the tripartite talks. In October, 
The Telegraph reported that Ethiopia is finalizing the construction of the dam and then will start 
filling its reservoir. 
 
Cairo hosted a Tripartite National Committee on Renaissance Dam (TNCRD) meeting in 
November to discuss the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. However, the meeting ended without 
reaching consensus. The meeting has become a subject of concern among experts, parliament 
members, and former officials.  
 
Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, Mohamed Abdel-Ati, said that TNCRD did not 
reach an agreement on adopting guidelines. The guidelines were indicated in a report prepared 
by a technical committee on the effects of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile 
Basin States after two days of talks.  
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Abdel-Ati declared that Egypt approves of the report’s outcomes; however, Ethiopia and Sudan 
did not express consensus and called for amendments. Egypt halted all negotiations and said that 
all future decisions are at the hand of the cabinet (El Tawil, 2017).  
 
Points of disagreement  
 
Abdel Aty clarified that one of the main disagreements during negotiations is that Ethiopia and 
Sudan insist on not abiding by the documents endorsed by the three countries to be used in 
studies conducted by the consulting company.  
 
The documents indicate that the base that must be used for determining the effects and possible 
damages of the dam is the current status of the eastern Nile Basin without the presence of the 
dam. However, Ethiopia wants the dam to be included, which goes against logic, against what is 
done in studies on dams with trans-border effects and against the contracts.  
 
On the other hand, Sudan wants to include “future usages” of the dam when measuring the 
current status of the basin. It also refused Egypt’s proposition of depending on the water shares 
identified in the 1959 Agreement(El Tawil, 2017).  
 
Sudan and Ethiopia also rejected an Egyptian proposition of not using data submitted to conduct 
the studies in another context, so that such data would not result in changing the current legal 
status of any party except for the execution of the studies and the Declaration of Principles 
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signed by the three countries in 2015.  
 
The minister expressed his surprise at the Ethiopian and Sudanese rejection of the proposition 
that would eliminate their concerns, as these data would not be used against Sudan in the 
TNCRD. The data prove that Sudan only uses its water shares as determined in the 1959 
Agreement guaranteeing that all three countries would not change their status over the 
agreement, which is a concern to Ethiopia(El Tawil, 2017).  
 
Abdel Aty added that Sudan and Ethiopia insist that the data used in the studies should not entail 
any duties or rights for involved parties. They also insist that parties do not have to abide by the 
results of the studies on the dam’s effects, which abolishes the purpose of conducting such 
studies in the first place.  
 
Ethiopia wants to give directions to the consulting company, which contradicts the content of the 
contract on crucial aspects to include in the studies. For instance, Ethiopia wants the consulting 
company to disregard the dam’s effect on soil salinity and the subsequent economic, social and 
environmental effects, so that the dam would appear to not have any effect on Egypt, the minister 
said.  
 
Abdel Aty clarified that Egypt would be affected the most by the dam established on the Blue 
Nile, as it is the last downstream country and because constructions are taking place without 
prior agreement on how the dam will be operated and filled based on clear studies explaining its 
effects(El Tawil, 2017).  
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On January 30, 2018, a tripartite summit meeting between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia took place 
on the sidelines of the African Union (AU)’s 30th summit in Addis Ababa discussing mutual 
cooperation, the latest developments of GERD negotiations, and "means of overcoming the 
hurdles in their way." After the tripartite meeting, Sisi reiterated that none of the three countries 
would be harmed by GERD (Egypt Today staff, 2018).  
 
The leaders of the three countries agreed to hold a meeting by their ministers of irrigation and 
foreign affairs and the National Tripartite Commission preparing a report in a month that 
includes solutions to all pending technical issues. That is in addition to exchanging technical 
information and studies. 
 
The Sudanese president expressed his country’s intention to work within the framework of the 
tripartite national committee in order to reach consensus on all outstanding technical issues.  
 
“Ethiopia's and Sudan's interest is Egypt's as well...we are speaking as one country, not three 
states,” Sisi stated. When asked by one of the reporters if the dam's crisis is over, Sisi answered, 
“There is no crisis” (Egypt Today staff; 2018).  
 
On April 6, 2018, Egypt's Foreign Minister Sameh Shokry announced that the negotiations that 
took place in Khartoum by the delegations of the three countries had failed (Egypt Today staff, 
2018).  
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3.2.2- Terrorism 
 
Amid the January 25th Revolt in 2011, terrorism has started to take place in North Sinai 
as a natural gas pipeline supplying natural gas to Israel was blown up on February 5 six days 
before the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak. Three incidents of the sort occurred 
later in the same year, and another in 2015 (Aboudi, 2011).  
 
On August 5, 2011, militants killed 16 border security guards stealing an armored vehicle 
and escaping across borders with Israel where they were killed (BBC Arabic, 2017). The incident 
incurred a forced resignation of former Defense Minister Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy and 
ex-chief of staff Lieutenant General Sami Anan. They were replaced respectively by incumbent 
President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, formerly head of military intelligence, and Lieutenant General 
Sedki Sobhy, currently the defense minister.  
 
In May 2012, seven border security guards were abducted and released a week later 
through a tribal medication with kidnapers. These belonged to al-Tawhid WalJehad group which 
demanded the release of six of its members sentenced to death in September 2011 for 
assassinating seven policemen in North Sinai. The same group was implicated in bomb attacks 
on Sinai tourist resorts in 2004 and 2006 (Perry & Mohamed, 2013).  
 
Both incidents occurred under former President Mohamed Morsi, who was elected in 
June 2012 and ousted a year later over mass protests that took place between June 30 and July 3, 
2013. Morsi was a member of the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and presided the Freedom 
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and Justice Party which was formed after the uprising. It won the majority of seats in the 
parliament in 2011 before it was resolved in 2012 as the election was ruled unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Constitutional Court.   
 
Following Morsi's ouster, terrorism was extended to other governorates targeting both 
civilians and security personnel. Although terror attacks have decreased significantly in most of 
Egypt, North Sinai remained a headquarters for terrorist groups. An attack on Al Rawda Mosque 
in North Sinai's Bir al-Abd claimed the lives of 311 civilians on November 24.  
 
As a result, a massive security operation was launched against terrorists in the 
governorate starting February 9 for 20 days as the president had set a deadline to eradicate 
terrorism in the area in three months following the massacre. However, the Chief of Staff 
Mohamed Farid Hegazy asked the president to extend the operation till the goal is achieved.  
 
Before the mosque attack, terrorism had targeted Christian citizens multiple times. The 
most prominent incidents were the bombing of the cathedral in Cairo on December 11, 2016, a 
twin attack on churches in Tanta and Alexandria cities on Easter day in 2017, and the shooting at 
a bus carrying Christian citizens in the Upper Egyptian governorate Minya on May 26, 2017 
during Ramadan. The death tolls in each attack mounted to dozens in addition to injuries.  
 
Attacks on churches, planting bombs in the streets, targeting security ambushes and 
checkpoints as well as public properties and establishments all over Egypt have become quite 
frequent right after the ouster of Morsi. In one year before Sisi became president in June 2014, 
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three security directorates had been bombed. These were the ones of South Sinai, Cairo and 
Daqahliya which was targeted twice.  Terrorism caused hundreds of deaths among security 
personnel and civilians between 2013 till present.  
On October 20, 2017, clashes between Egyptian Central Security Forces and terrorists 
near Wadi Gadid-Wahat Road in Giza Desert resulted in the death of 17 officers and the 
abduction of Captain Mohamed El Haeis after he was shot in his leg. A joint operation by the 
police and the army was launched on October 27, 2017 with air cover near Libyan borders where 
perpetrators were hiding leaving 15 terrorists killed and freeing Haeis (Moahmed, 2017). A 
terrorist was arrested and is being prosecuted while others had escaped.  
 
On December 29, 2017, an attempted attack on Mar Mina church in Helwan occurred 
when two armed men used firearms to target dozens of Christian worshippers attending a 
religious service, according to a statement by the Ministry of Interior(Abdel Maguid, 2017).  
 
The attackers opened fire at a household appliances shop, then attempted to trespass the church's 
security. The security forces captured one of the terrorists after shooting him and managed to 
defuse an explosive belt that was fastened around the militant's chest, while the other one fled the 
scene, the ministry said. 
 
The attack resulted in the death of five citizens and a policeman. A citizen called Salah El 
Mougy had been the first to capture the terrorist before the security forces stationed around the 
church came.  
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Chapter 4- Methodology 
 
This research used the content analysis as a method to codify and to interpret variables, 
turning qualitative data into quantitative data.Content analysis is a method of studying and 
analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of 
measuring variables (Neuendorf, 2002).  
 
Systematic means that the content to be analyzed is selected according to explicit and 
consistently applied rules. Objective means that the researchers' idiosyncrasies and biases should 
not enter into the findings. Quantitative means that the goal of content analysis is an accurate 
representation of a body of messages (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).   
 
Krippendorff (1980) argues that content analysis "can be traced back to inquisitorial 
pursuits by the Church in the 17th century" and to the Great Depression of the 1930s whereas 
newspapers in the United States were scrutinized by politicians seeking to determine the root 
causes of the economic downturn. Thereby, social scientists learnt of "newspaper analysis" as a 
research method, and later, the "content analysis" term emerged (Thayer, Evans, McBride, 
Queen, & Spyridakis).  
 
Content analysis has two types. One is Manifest Analysis, which involves just counting 
words, phrases, or other "surface" features of the text itself. The other is Latent Analysis, which 
"involves interpreting the underlying meaning of the text" (Thayer, Evans, McBride, Queen, & 
Spyridakis). The latter is used in this study.  
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4.1 - Uses of Content Analysis: 
 
Content analysis helps describing communication content, testing hypothesis of message 
characteristics, comparing media content to the real world, assessing the image of particular 
groups in society, conducting framing analysis, and establishing a starting point for studies of 
media effects (Wimmer& Dominick, 2011). 
 
4.2 - Limitations of Content Analysis: 
  
Content analysis alone cannot serve as basis for examining the effects of content on an 
audience. The findings of a particular content analysis are limited to the framework of the 
categories, and the definitions used in that analysis. While conducting a study, the researcher 
may face the obstacle of a lack of messages relevant to the research as some topics receive little 
exposure in the mass media (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).  
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4.3- Research questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: What are the frames dominantly used by top political Facebook pages, diverse 
publications, and regular Twitter users when tackling terrorism and GERD crises? 
RQ2: To what extent stereotypical frames were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises? 
RQ3: To what extent rumors were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?  
RQ4: To what extent those national security crises were linked to 2018 Presidential Election? 
RQ5: What are the master and tactical frames adopted by each group when tackling terrorism 
and GERD crises? 
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4.4- Sampling 
 
Purposive sampling, which is a non-probability sampling method, was used in all studies 
conducting framing analysis for social media posts so it will be used in this one by analyzing 
online units on terrorism and GERD. A purposive sample consists of elements selected for 
specific characteristics or qualities and eliminates those who fail to meet these criteria (Wimmer, 
Dominick, 2011).  
 
The universe of the population studied is the following top nine political pages as they 
have the highest number of followers on Facebook in Egypt, according to Socialbakers Website 
in January 2018.  
 
The one million-Egyptian campaign against Baradei: 2,164,758 followers 
President, I am Sorry (AsefyaRayes): 2, 021,465 followers 
The electronic Egyptian army: 1, 568, 142 followers 
Sawiris, we are also joking (BenhazaryaSawiris): 1, 497, 011 followers 
6th of April Youth Movement: 1, 391, 069 followers 
Ikhwan online: 1,067, 848 followers 
Against the Muslim Brotherhood (Anti-Ikhwan): 1, 064,505 followers 
Nation Guardians: 904, 137 followers 
The Revolutionist Socialists: 747, 577 followers 
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That is in addition to state-owned newspaper Al Ahram, the privately-owned newspaper 
Al Masry El Youm, and the partisan newspaper Al Wafd. As such, the samples would represent 
different types of agenda-setting in online publications. The units of analysis will be all posts by 
those pages on terrorism and GERD, all op-eds published on the websites of the aforementioned 
publications tackling terrorism and GERD, and all tweets by regular Twitter users having the 
hashtags #Rawda_Mosque, #Wahat_accident, and #Helwan. That is within a time frame starting 
from September 1, 2017 till March 31, 2018. Less than five tweets found by regular users on the 
hashtag #Ethiopian_Dam. Thus, no tweets on GERD were included in the sample studied. The 
total number of samples is 817.  
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4.5 – Inter-coder Reliability and Internal Validity: 
According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), it is essential to analyze a subsample (ranging from 
10-25 percent) of the data analyzed in order to determine the inter-coder reliability coefficient. 
Holsti (1969) suggests this formula
2𝑀
𝑁1+𝑁2 
 for determining the reliability of nominal data in terms 
of percentage agreement (Wimmer, Dominick, 2011). Mis the number of coding decisions on 
which two coders agree and N1 and N2 are the total number of coding decisions by the first and 
second coder respectively.  
 
In this study, three coders coded 10 percent of the whole sample and the results for each two 
coders were compared independently using Holsti’s formula. Later on, the results for all coders 
have been summed and divided by the number of coders showing an overall high percentage of 
97 percent, meaning that the research results are reliable.  
 
To ensure internal validity, meaning the study measures what is supposed to measure, categories 
must be exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and each variable must be measured with categories that 
are the highest level of measurement possible (Wimmer, Dominick, 2011). 
 
4.6- Data Analysis  
The statistical analysis used the SPSS statistical program and included simple frequencies, and 
Chi-square.  
 
 
 
49 
 
4.7- Operational Definitions: 
Frame type: 
Conflict: In the terrorism context, it refers to clashes and confrontations between security forces, 
and terrorists in order to eliminate them and achieve victory and stability. In the GERD context, 
it refers to Ethiopia's insistence on its stance.  
Emotional aspect: In the terrorism context, it refers to the emphasis on human losses. In the 
GERD context, it is not applicable. 
Grim consequences: In the terrorism context, it refers to the negative political, economic, and 
social consequences of terror, if it takes over the country and becomes further widespread. In the 
GERD context, it refers to the negative consequences of decreasing Egypt's water share.  
Responsibility: In both contexts, it refers to calling for citizens, media and the state to act 
responsibly.  
Problem definition: In both contexts, it refers to describing the nature of the crisis. 
Causal interpretation: In both contexts, it refers to the causes and driving forces behind the 
crisis.  
Moral Evaluation: In both contexts, it refers to judging the moral validity of the acts assumed 
by terrorists, Ethiopia, and Sudan.  
Solutions: In both contexts, it refers to suggested solutions or those already sought by the state.  
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Chapter 5- Data Findings and Analysis: 
Table A: The number of samples derived from each Facebook page - GERD 
Pages Frequency Percent 
Campaign against Baradei 53 81.5% 
Asefyarayes 0 0.0% 
Electronic army 2 3.1% 
BenhazaryaSawiris 0 0.0% 
6th of April movements 1 1.5% 
Ikhwan online 0 0.0% 
Anti-Ikhwan 8 12.3% 
Nation guardians 0 0.0% 
Socialist Revolutionists  1 1.5% 
Total 65 100.0% 
 
Table B: The number of samples derived from each publication - GERD 
Publication Frequency Percent 
Ahram 46 42.9% 
El Masry El Youm 61 57.1% 
El Wafd 0 0.0% 
Total 107 100% 
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Table C: The number of samples derived from each Facebook page - 
Terrorism 
Pages Frequency Percent 
Campaign against Baradei 42 36.8% 
Asefyarayes 0 0.0% 
Electronic army 17 14.9% 
BenhazaryaSawiris 0 0.0% 
6th of April movenments 5 4.4% 
Ikhwan online 0 0.0% 
Anti-Ikhwan 39 34.2% 
Nation guardians 10 8.8% 
Socialist Revolutionists  1 0.9% 
Total 114 100.0% 
 
Table D: The number of samples derived from each publication - Terrorism 
Publication Frequency Percent 
Ahram 309 80.3% 
El Masry El Youm 75 19.5% 
El Wafd 1 0.3% 
Total 385 100% 
 
Table E: The number of samples derived from Twitter through hashtags - 
Terrorism 
Hashtag Frequency Percent 
Rawda Mosque 109 75.70% 
Wahat Incident 31 21.50% 
Helwan 4 2.80% 
Total 144 100% 
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Table 1: Terrorism and GERD Publications 
 
Publication 
Terrorism 
publications 
GERD 
Publications 
Ahram 80.3% 42.9% 
El Masry El Youm 19.5% 57.1% 
El Wafd 0.3% 0.0% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Chi square = 30.110% (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different 
distributions of publications in the 2 groups.  
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Figure 1: Terrorism and GERD Publications 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure (1) shows that the great majority of op-eds on terrorism are in the state-
owned newspaper Al-Ahram (99%), while the percentages for GERD are more 
balanced between Al-Ahram (42.9) and the private newspaper El Masry El Youm 
(57.1%). El Wafd had no op-eds on GERD and only one on terrorism. 
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Table 2: Terrorism and GERD - Facebook Pages 
 
Pages Terrorism Facebook GERD Facebook 
Campaign against Baradei 36.8% 81.5% 
Electronic army 14.9% 3.1% 
6th of April movement 4.4% 1.5% 
Anti-Ikhwan 34.2% 12.3% 
Nation guardians 8.8% 0.0% 
Socialist Revolutionists  0.9% 1.5% 
  100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi square = 45.317 (p=0.0001) Highly significant indicating different 
distributions of pages for both themes.  
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Table 2: Terrorism and GERD - Facebook Pages 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure (2) shows that both issues are more mentioned in pro-regime Facebook 
pages than anti-regime ones. Three studied pages did not mention both issues. 
These are AsefyaRayes, BenhazaryaSawiris, and Ikhwan Online.  
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RQ1: What are the frames dominantly used by top political Facebook pages, 
diverse publications, and regular Twitter users when tackling terrorism and GERD 
crises? 
 
 
Table 3: Terrorism and GERD - Frame types 
 
Frame type 
Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
GERD 
Publications 
GERD 
Facebook 
 Conflict 20.0% 9% 50% 20% 64% 
 Emotional 
aspect 10.3% 15% 21% 1% 0% 
 Grim 
consequences 1.9% 2% 3% 7% 4% 
 Responsibility 12.5% 16% 8% 3% 4% 
 Problem 
definition 9.9% 17% 1% 37% 1% 
 Causal 
interpretation 25.7% 36% 11% 5% 1% 
 Moral 
Evaluation 7.8% 4% 2% 7% 0% 
 Solutions 10% 1% 4% 21% 24% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi square = 285.376(p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different 
distributions of frame types in the 5 groups. (very high chi square due to the 
existence of many values less than 5) 
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Figure 3: Terrorism and GERD - Frame types 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure (3) shows thatthe conflict frame is most dominant in Facebook pages for 
both issues (50% for terrorism and 64% for GERD). The problem definition frame 
was most dominant in publications tackling the GERD issue (37%).The causal 
interpretation frame was most dominant when tackling the terrorism issue in 
studied publications (25.7%) and tweets (36%).  
 
The conflict frame makes up one fifth of op-eds on terrorism, and Facebook posts 
on GERD.The emotional aspect frame represents 21 percent of Facebook posts on 
terrorism.The solutions frame is high in all samples on GERD (21 percent in op-
eds and 24 percent in Facebook posts).   
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9.9%
25.7%
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Table 4: Terrorism:Publications - Twitter - Facebook - Causes of terrorism 
 
Causes of Terrorism 
Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
 Poverty and 
ignorance 4% 2% 0% 
 Religious extremism 29% 25% 9% 
 Conspiracy by enemy 
states 59% 26% 
74% 
Political Conflict 9% 48% 17% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi square = 70.436 (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different distributions 
of the causes of terrorism for the 3 groups.  
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Figure 4: Terrorism: Publications - Twitter - Facebook - Causes of terrorism 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure (4) shows that most cited cause of terrorism in both publications and 
Facebook pages was conspiracy by enemy states (in order to divide the country's 
territories and make it comply with the demands serving their interests) as it made 
up almost two-thirds of the former and three-quarters of the latter. Religious 
extremism was present in almost one third of the causes cited in publications 
samples coming majorly from Al Ahram. The political conflict cause made up 
almost one third of the reasons cited behind terror on Twitter.  
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Table 5: GERD: Publications-Facebook - Factors contributing to GERD crisis 
 
Factors contributing to GERD crisis 
GERD 
publications 
GERD 
Facebook 
Ethiopia's need for electricity 23% 0% 
Conspiracy by enemy states 54% 100% 
Both 23% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Chi square = 60.000  (p=0.0001) Highly significant indicating different 
distributions of factors contributing to GERD crisis among both groups.  
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Figure 5: GERD: Publications-Facebook - Factors contributing to GERD 
crisis 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
Figure (5) shows that GERD was mostly viewed as a conspiracy by enemy states 
in both media. Conspiracy by enemy states is the only cited factor to be 
contributing to the GERD crisis. Almost half of samples from publications shed 
light of Ethiopia's need for electricity. Those who stated both estimate that such 
need was exploited by enemy states.  
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Table 6: Terrorism: Publications / Twitter / Facebook - Consequences of 
Terrorism 
 
Consequences of 
terrorism 
Terrorism 
publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
 
Socio-political 76% 97% 60% 
Economic  11% 3% 40% 
 Both  13% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Chi square = 77.234  (p=0.0001 )highly significant indicating different 
distributions of consequences of terrorism for the 3 groups.  
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Figure 6: Terrorism: Publications / Twitter / Facebook - Consequences of 
Terrorism 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Figure (6) shows that the socio-political consequences were the most cited in all 
three media. The economic consequences were also emphasized often on Twitter 
(40%).   
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RQ2: To what extent stereotypical frames were used when tackling terrorism and 
GERD crises? 
 
Table 7: Terrorism and GERD - Accusations of  
 
Accusations Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
GERD 
publications 
GERD 
Facebook 
Treason 
against 
other group 
4% 1% 4% 0% 0% 
Ignorance 
against 
other group 
8% 1% 4% 0% 3% 
Treason 
against the 
regime 
0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
Regime's 
failure 
11% 18% 4% 25% 3% 
 
Chi square = 75.296%  (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different 
distributions of accusationsfor the 5 groups. (Very high chi square due to the 
existence of too many zeros) 
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Figure 7: Terrorism and GERD - Accusations of 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure (7) shows that accusationsof regime failureare the highest when tackling 
GERD in publications, and when tackling terrorism on twitter, and in publications. 
Accusations of treason against the regime only exist on Twitter in the context of 
terrorism as most of the Tweets were opposing the regime. For that same reason, 
accusations of regime failure on Twitter were the second highest (18%) after 
GERD in publications (25%) as the most samples came from El Masry El Youm, 
which is not affiliated with the regime. Accusations against the other group existed 
only in the context of terrorism, however, in small percentages, as it was 
intertwined with the responsibility frame. Accusations of ignorance among the 
other group was the highest when tackling terrorism in publications. 
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Table 8: Terrorism and GERD - Emphasis on the regime's achievements  
 
Emphasis 
Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
GERD 
publications 
GERD 
Facebook 
Yes 46% 4% 40% 11% 34% 
 
Figure 8: Terrorism and GERD - Emphasis on the regime's achievements  
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Figure (8) shows that the emphasis on the regime'sachievements was most 
common in the terrorism theme on Facebook and in publications whereas most 
samples came from pro-regime sources. The same applies to the GERD theme 
when tackled on Facebook.    
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RQ3: To what extent rumors were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?  
 
 
Table 9: Terrorism and GERD - Rumors: 
 
Rumors 
Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Twitter 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
GERD 
Facebook 
Rumors 
1% 3% 3% 20% 
Themes: 
Intergroup 
hostility 0% 0% 0% 8% 
Themes: Mistrust 
toward the regime 
0% 50% 0% 8% 
Themes: Support 
to the regime 
100% 50% 100% 83% 
Rumors type: 
Pipedream  0% 25% 100% 83% 
Rumors type: 
Bogie  100% 0% 0% 0% 
Rumors type: 
Wedge-driving 0% 75% 0% 17% 
 
Chi square = 791.861(p=0.000) highly significant indicating different distributions 
of rumors/themes/types for the 4 groups.(very high chi square due to the existence 
of too many zeros) 
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Figure 9 
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Figure (9) shows that rumors are mostly present in Facebook posts tackling GERD. 
The most common theme among those is support to the regime as most samples 
found were from pro-regime pages. A positive point is that rumors are absent in 
publications when discussing GERD while it is only one percent for terrorism. The 
theme is also support to the regime. The percentages are even for both social media 
when tackling terrorism. However, the 'support to the regime' theme was the only 
one existing for rumors in the Facebook posts, while it made up only 50 percent of 
rumors in the Tweets. The other 50 percent went to the 'mistrust toward the regime' 
theme. The pipedream type made up the great majority of rumors on Facebook, 
while all rumors in publications when tackling terrorism were of the bogie type. 
The wedge-driving type was most common in Tweets tackling terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ4: To what extent terrorism and GERD criseswere linked to 2018 Presidential 
Election? 
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Table 10: Terrorism and GERD – Election 
 
Election 
Terrorism 
Publications 
Terrorism 
Facebook 
GERD 
Facebook 
13.5% 14.0% 3.1% 
 
Figure 10: Terrorism and GERD – Election 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure (10) shows that the terrorism issue was most mentioned in the context of 
2018 Presidential Election in the studied publications (13.5) and Facebook pages 
(14%). That was absent in Twitter and in publications' op-eds on GERD. All those 
samples were pro-regime posts and op-eds supporting President Abdel Fatah al-
Sisi for a second term to stand in solidarity with the state in the face of such crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Facebook pages – Terrorism – Election 
    
Elec Pages To
13.5% 14.0%
3.1%
Terrorism
Publications
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TERRORISM/GERD 
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tion tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electron
ic army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Nation 
guardian
s 
Socialist 
Revolutionis
ts  
 
7 2 0 5 1 1 16 
43.7% 12.5% 0% 31.2% 6.20% 6.2% 
100
% 
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Table 12: Facebook pages –Terrorism - Frame types 
    
Frame 
types 
Pages 
To
tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolutioni
sts  
 
 Conflict 
23 8 1 28 6 0 66 
34.8% 12.1% 1.5% 42.4% 9.10% 0% 
100
% 
 Emotional 
aspect 
12 6 0 8 1 0 27 
44.4% 22.2% 0% 
29.65
% 
3.7% 0% 
100
% 
 Grim 
consequen
ces 
0 0 1 1 2 0 4 
0% 0% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0% 
100
% 
 
Responsibi
lity 
2 3 0 4 2 0 11 
18.2% 27.3% 0% 36.4% 18.2% 0% 
100
% 
 Problem 
definition 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
100
% 
 Causal 
interpretat
ion 
3 0 2 7 1 1 14 
21.4% 0.0% 14.3% 50.0% 7.1% 7.1% 
100
% 
 Moral 
Evaluation 
0 1 0 2 0 0 3 
0% 33.3% 0% 66.7% 0% 0% 
100
% 
 Solutions 
1 1 0 3 5 0 10  
10.0% 10.0% 0% 30.0% 50.0% 0% 
100
%  
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Table 13: Facebook pages – Causes of terrorism 
    
Causes of 
terrorism 
Pages 
T
o
t
a
l 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movement
s 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolution
ists  
 
 Religious 
extremism 
1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
  50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100
% 
 Conspiracy 
by enemy 
states 
6 0 0 9 2 0 17 
  35.3% 0.0% 0.0% 52.9% 77.8% 0.0% 
100
% 
Political 
Conflict 
0 0 3 0 0 1 4 
  0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
100
% 
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Table 14:Facebook pages - Consequences of terrorism  
   
Consequence
s of 
terrorism 
Pages 
To
tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolutioni
sts  
 
Socio-
political 
0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
0% 33.3% 0% 33.3% 33.3% 0% 
10
0
% 
Economic  
0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
0% 0% 50.0% 0% 50.0% 0% 
10
0
% 
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Table 15: Facebook pages – Terrorism – Accusations 
    
Accusations 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of 
April 
movement
s 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolutio
nists  
 
of treason 
against the other 
group: 
0 1 0 3 0 0 4 
0.0% 25.0% 0% 75.0% 0% 0% 
100
% 
ofignorance 
against the other 
group: 
0 2 0 2 0 0 4 
0% 50.0% 0% 50.0% 0% 0% 
100
% 
of regime's 
failure: 
0 0 4 0 0 1 5 
0% 0% 80.0% 0% 0% 20.0% 
100
% 
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Table 16: Facebook pages – Terrorism - Emphasis on regime achievements 
  
Regime 
achieveme
nts 
Pages 
To
tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolutioni
sts  
 
18 10 1 14 3 0 46 
3.9.1% 21.7% 2.17% 30.4% 6.5% 0% 
100
% 
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Table 17: Facebook pages – Terrorism –Rumors 
     
Rumors 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Nation 
guardia
ns 
Socialist 
Revolution
ists  
 
Rumors 
2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
66.7% 0% 0% 33.3% 0% 0% 
100
% 
Themes of 
rumors : 
Support to 
the regime  
2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
66.7% 0% 0% 33.3% 0% 0% 
100
% 
Rumor's 
Types : 
Pipedream  
1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
50.0% 0% 0% 50.0% 0% 0% 
100
% 
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Table 18: Facebook – GERD – Election 
 
Elec
tion 
Pages 
To
tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electroni
c army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Socialist 
Revolutionist
s  
1 0 0 0 1 2 
50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
10
0% 
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Table 19: Facebook pages - GERD - Frame types 
Frame 
types 
Pages 
To
tal 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movements 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Socialist 
Revolutioni
sts  
 Conflict 
37 2 0 6 0 45 
82.2% 4.4% 0.0% 13.3% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
 Grim 
consequenc
es 
0  1 1 0  1 3 
 0% 33.3% 33.3% 0%  33.3% 
10
0
% 
 
Responsibi
lity 
  
0 1 0 2 0 3 
0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
 Problem 
definition 
  
0 1 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
 Causal 
interpretat
ion 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
 Solutions 
16 1 0 0 0 17 
94.1% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
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Table 20: Facebook pages - Factors contributing to GERD crisis 
 
Factors 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movenment
s 
Anti-
Ikhwa
n 
Socialist 
Revolution
ists  
Conspiracy 
by enemy 
states 
11 1 0 1 0 13 
  84.60% 7.70% 0.00% 7.70% 0.00% 
10
0
% 
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Table 21- Facebook pages – GERD – Accusations 
 
Accusations 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of 
April 
movement
s 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Socialist 
Revolutio
nists  
of ignorance 
against the other 
group: 
0 0 0 2 0 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100.0
% 
0.0% 
10
0
% 
of regime's 
failure: 
0 0 1 0 1 2 
0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
10
0
% 
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Table 22: Facebook pages –GERD - Emphasis on regime achievements 
 
Emphasis on 
Regime’s 
achievements 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movenmen
ts 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Socialist 
Revolutio
nists  
14 2 0 6 0 22 
63.60% 9.10% 0.00% 
27.30
% 
0.00% 
10
0
% 
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Table 23: Facebook pages – GERD –Rumors 
 
Rumors 
Pages 
T
ot
al 
Campaign 
against 
Baradei 
Electro
nic 
army 
6th of April 
movement
s 
Anti-
Ikhw
an 
Socialist 
Revolution
ists  
Rumors 
7 1 1 4 0 13 
53.8% 7.7% 7.7% 30.8% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
Themes of 
rumors : 
Intergroup 
hostility 
0  0 0 1 0  1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100.0
% 
0.0% 
10
0
% 
Themes of 
rumors : 
Mistrust 
toward the 
regime 
0 0  1 0 0  1 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
Themes of 
rumors : 
Support to the 
regime  
7 0  0 3  0 10 
70.0% 0.0% 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 
10
0
% 
Rumor's Types 
: Pipedream  
7 0 0 3 0 10 
  70.0% 
0.0%  
0.0% 30.0% 0.0%  
10
0
% 
Rumor's Types 
: Wedge 
driving 
0 0 1 1 0  2 
  
0.0% 
0.0%  
50.0% 50.0% 
0.0%  
10
0
% 
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Table 24: Publications – GERD - Frame types 
 
Frames Ahram El Masry El Youm Total 
 Conflict 
12 19 31 
38.7% 61.3% 100% 
 Emotional aspect 
2 0 2 
100.0% 0.0% 100% 
 Grim consequences 
2 9 11 
18.2% 81.8% 100% 
 Responsibility 
0 4 4 
0.0% 100.0% 100% 
 Problem definition 
24 33 57 
42.1% 57.9% 100% 
 Causal 
interpretation 
2 5 7 
28.6% 71.4% 100% 
 Moral Evaluation 
5 5 10 
50.0% 50.0% 100% 
 Solutions 
15 18 33 
45.5% 54.5% 100% 
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Table 25: Publications – GERD - Factors contributing to GERD crisis 
 
Factors Ahram El Masry El Youm Total 
Ethiopia's need for 
electricity 
1 5 6 
16.7% 83.3% 100% 
Conspiracy by enemy states 
8 6 14 
57.1% 42.9% 100% 
Both 
4 2 6 
66.7% 33.3% 100% 
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Table 26: Publications - GERD –Accusations 
 
Accusations 
of regime's 
failure 
Ahram El Masry El Youm Total 
0 27 27 
0.0% 100.0% 100% 
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Table 27: Publications - GERD - Emphasis on regime's achievements 
 
Emphasis on regime's 
achievements 
Ahram El Masry El Youm Total 
6 6 12 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 28: Twitter Hashtags - Frame types 
 
Frame types 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident Helwan Total 
 Conflict 
14 2 0 16 
87.5% 12.5% 0.0% 100% 
 Emotional aspect 
14 10 2 26 
53.8% 38.5% 7.7% 100% 
 Grim consequences 
3 0 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
 Responsibility 
11 14 2 27 
40.7% 51.9% 7.4% 100% 
 Problem definition 
29 0 0 29 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
 Causal 
interpretation 
55 7 0 62 
88.7% 11.3% 0.0% 100% 
 Moral Evaluation 
6 1 0 7 
85.7% 14.3% 0.0% 100% 
 Solutions 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
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Table 29: Twitter Hashtags - Causes of terrorism 
 
Cause 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident Helwan Total 
 Poverty and ignorance 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
 Religious extremism 
16 0 0 16 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
 Conspiracy by enemy 
states 
14 3 0 17 
82.4% 17.6% 0.0% 100% 
Political Conflict 
27 4 0 31 
87.1% 12.9% 0.0% 100% 
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Table 30: Twitter Hashtags - Consequences of terrorism 
 
Consequences 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident Helwan Total 
Socio-
political 
29 0 0 29 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Economic  
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
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Table 31: Twitter Hashtags – Accusations 
 
Accusations 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident 
Helwa
n Total 
of treason against the other 
group 
2 0 0 2 
100% 0.0% 0.0% 
100
% 
of ignorance against the other 
group: 
1 1 0 2 
50% 50.0% 0.0% 
100
% 
of treason against the regime 
14 0 0 14 
100% 0.0% 0.0% 
100
% 
of regime's failure 
13 10 3 26 
50% 38.5% 11.5% 
100
% 
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Table 32: Twitter Hashtags - Emphasis on regime's achievements: 
 
Emphasis on regime's 
achievements 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident 
Helwa
n Total 
3 2 0 5 
60.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
100
% 
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Table 33: Twitter Hashtags – Rumors 
 
Rumors 
Rawda 
Mosque 
Wahat 
Incident Helwan Total 
Rumors 
  
4 0 0 4 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Themes: Mistrust toward the regime 
  
2 0 0 2 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Themes: Support to the regime  
  
2 0 0 2 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Types: Pipedream (rumors about 
wished-for outcomes) 
  
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Types: Wedge-driving (group 
divisive rumors with aggression) 
  
3 0 0 3 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 34: Publications - Terrorism –Election 
 
 
Election 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
Yes 
52 0 0 52 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 35: Publications - Terrorism - Frame type 
 
Frame types 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
 Conflict 
113 2 0 115 
98.3% 1.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
 Emotional aspect 
48 10 1 59 
81.4% 16.9% 1.7% 100.0% 
 Grim consequences 
11 0 0 11 
100.0%     100.0% 
 Responsibility 
54 18 0 72 
75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 Problem definition 
47 10 0 57 
82.5% 17.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
 Causal 
interpretation 
136 12 0 148 
91.9% 8.1%   100.0% 
 Moral Evaluation 
39 6 0 45 
86.7% 13.3%   100.0% 
 Solutions 
51 17 0 68 
75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 36: Publications - Terrorism - Causes of terrorism 
 
Causes 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram 
El Masry El 
Youm 
El Wafd 
 Poverty and ignorance 
6 1 0 7 
85.7% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
 Religious extremism 
47 10 0 57 
82.5% 17.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
 Conspiracy by enemy 
states 
106 11 0 117 
90.6% 9.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
Political Conflict 
17 1 0 18 
94.4% 5.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 37: Publications - Terrorism- Consequences of terrorism 
 
Consequences 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
Socio-political 55 3 0 58 
  94.8% 5.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
Economic 6 2 0 8 
  75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Both 10 0 0 10 
  100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 38: Publications - Terrorism – Accusations 
 
Accusations 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
of treason against the other 
group 
15 2 0 17 
88.2% 11.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
of ignorance against the 
other group: 
29 2 0 31 
93.5% 6.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
of treason against the 
regime 
0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
of regime's failure 
17 27 0 44 
38.6% 61.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 39: Publications - Terrorism - Emphasis on regime's achievements 
 
Emphasis on regime's 
achievements 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
174 3 1 178 
97.8% 1.7% 0.6% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 40: Publications - Terrorism – Rumors 
 
Rumors 
Publications 
Total 
Ahram El Masry El Youm El Wafd 
Rumors 
2 0 0 2 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Themes: Support to the 
regime  
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Types: Bogie (rumors 
about dreadful 
consequences) 
1 0 0 1 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion: 
  
The study found that the most dominant frames when tackling the terrorism and GERD 
crises are conflict, causal interpretation, and problem definition, while stereotypical frames and 
rumors did not exceed 25 percent and 20 percent respectively in any of the samples derived from 
each source on each topic. That is unlike Hamdy and Gomaa's (2012) study of the 2011 Egyptian 
uprising whereas the most dominant frame on social media was emotional aspect. On the other 
hand, the moral evaluation frame was the most dominant frame in Burch, Frederick, & 
Pegoraro's (2015) study of tweets on Vancouver riots.  
  
RQ5: What are the master and tactical framesadopted by each group when tackling terrorism and 
GERD crises? 
 
When tackled in studied Facebook pages and publications, terrorism was mostly 
identified as a conspiracy by enemy states who have exploited some existing social diseases in 
Egypt in order to destabilize, weaken, and divide the country's territory. Although the state has 
been viewed as taking all necessary security measures, many Al Ahram columnists reiterated that 
the state is doing little to combat religious extremism. 
 
The calls for solidarity with the state, and dealing with news and ideas circulating in 
different media with caution and increasing sense of responsibility have been quite dominant. In 
the overall across all media, the responsibility frame was used by supporters toward media 
people and social media users.  
101 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Rawda Mosque attack, the solutions suggested by Al Ahram 
columnists to combat terrorism consisted of developing Sinai, eliminating extremism, and 
holding accelerated prosecutions for terrorists, especially before military courts. There has been a 
great emphasis on the state's failure to achieve the last measure. Those writers linked that 
specific major attack to the security forces' success in laying a siege to terrorists' hiding areas and 
in achieving Palestinian reconciliation. They argued that such accomplishments triggered foreign 
powers conspiring against the country to back the attack as retaliation.  
 
As the number of victims was very high and many started to question the progress 
achieved in combating terror, the writers in the publication called for their colleagues to have a 
better sense of responsibility and help recipients understand that war on terror is a long battle that 
needs time. The same calls were promoted in Al Ahram during the Wahat incident as false 
numbers on the number of police officers' victims went viral, and it took days to liberate the 
injured officer Captain Mohamed El Hayes while there had been doubts he might be dead.  
 
By contrast, many columnists in El Masry El Youm called for the state to be faster in 
announcing numbers and explaining what is happening so that citizens would not resort to 
unreliable sources of information. They stated that it is the responsibility of the state to "respect 
the citizens' minds" and cope with the technology era whereas lots of information has been 
available in open and instant ways.  
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El Masry El Youm columnists highlighted the state's failure in combating religious 
extremism stressing that, although terror in Egypt is funded by enemy states conspiring against 
Egypt, the attacks are accomplished by brainwashed individuals. In the aftermath of the attack on 
the Rawda Mosque, the majority of those columnists suggested the socio-economic development 
of Sinai as a solution to deter terrorism in its northern part so as terrorist groups would not be 
able to move and hide easily without getting noticed. 
 
The pro-regime Facebook pages that tackled the GERD crisis pre-dominantly emphasized 
the conflict with Ethiopia and "entities" funding the dam to purposefully harm Egypt. The enemy 
states mentioned are Israel, Turkey, Qatar, and some business people having strong ties with 
them. On the other hand, the tactical frame deployed in such pages for that theme has been denial 
as the majority of posts repeatedly stated that the Egyptian state has a plan to deal with the crisis, 
and that no harm would be inflicted on the country.  
 
Some of the speculations indicated are that Egypt would be able to cut funding to the dam 
by enemy entities, and that it would resort to international arbitration which would be in its favor 
as the harm would be proven. The pages came up with speculations about measures that would 
mitigate the expected harm of the dam when it is completed and the filling of the reservoir 
finishes.  
 
In the first place, the construction of the five new electricity stations by Siemens would 
make up for the electricity that would not be generated by the high dam when its turbines stop 
due to low water levels. Some posts even claimed that they had already stopped by other stations 
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generated electricity instead so that citizens felt no difference. In the second place, based on what 
is clarified by experts that the dam is built on an earthquake belt, some posts argued that Egypt 
would not be flooded as the water would be directed to the channels of Toshka project, and 
Serapeum Siphon consisting of four underground pipes carrying Nile water beneath Suez Canal 
to Sinai for irrigation purposes.  
 
The international arbitration solution was also emphasized in Al Ahram so often 
expecting it would be in Egypt's favor as well with the conflict and conspiracy being dominant 
frames the same as studied Facebook posts. By contrast, El Masry El Youm adopted the end-run 
tactical frame as its columnists criticized the state for wasting time in technical negotiations 
rather than dealing with the political reasons/forces driving the dam's construction. They also 
emphasized Egypt's failure to internationalize the crisis so far.   
 
Al Ahram columnists emphasized the state's success in the face of the water crisis Egypt 
is facing and that would be worsened by the GERD by creating alternative water resources such 
as water recycling, and planning to establish desalination stations. Some shed light that Egypt is 
attempting to connect the Congo River with the Nile, and redirecting the Nile water wasted in 
swamps into channels that would reach Egypt.  
 
However, some of them warned of an upcoming war for water as a grim consequence, if 
Ethiopia insists on building such a large dam breaching international laws regulating projects on 
international rivers as only small dams are allowed. Some others suggested that Egypt has to 
create alternative water resources in parallel to harnessing Arab and global support for Egypt.  
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Al Ahram op-eds included applause to the tripartite summit meeting that took place in Addis 
Ababa in January 2018, and Egypt's endeavors to increase the economic and educational 
cooperation with both Ethiopia and Sudan. Those emphasized Egypt's good intentions since the 
beginning of the crisis and its historic ties with both countries which would enable them to go 
over any problems.  
 
The majority of tweets on terrorism came from the opposition which was known from the 
Rabaa sign put as the users' profile picture or describing the ouster of former President Mohamed 
Morsi, who is affiliated with the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, over mass protests as a 
coup. That is not a term used by regime supporters and most non-Islamist opposition as they 
perceive it as a revolution.  
 
Those users used the incorporation frame when reacting to the Rawda Mosque Attack as 
they accused the regime of orchestrating the incident for residents to leave North Sinai making 
room for Palestinians to be relocated from Gaza Strip closing the "century's deal" with Israel. 
That frame is pre-dominantly adopted by regime supporters and neutral citizens but is used in the 
context of conspiracy by enemy states, which are in this case Israel as it is accused of supporting 
terrorists in North Sinai to make residents flee the area and exacerbate the Egyptian state's 
resources to accept the deal.  
 
Such plan is perceived as part of a bigger conspiracy to divide existing Arab countries 
into mini-states divided according to creed and ethnicity, and that is an expansion to what is 
happening in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen as the Islamic State – in the former three - and some 
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militant factions are trying to seize and rule different territories within the border of each state. 
The guerrilla war that took place in those countries made room for foreign military intervention 
and turned them into fail states except for Iraq which has started recovering regaining full control 
over its territories.  
 
After the police succeeded in identifying the perpetrators of Wahat incident and they died 
in clashes in relatively short time, those regime-opponent users accused the interior ministry of 
killing "political detainees" and claiming they are terrorists. Some others claimed that the 
ministry wanted to kill the police officers participating in the mission for reasons they did not 
mention so it had to stage the whole attack. In sum, those opposition Twitter users went on 
accusing the current regime and the state of terrorism and treason applauding the brotherhood's 
regime despite of the group's long history of terror and ambition of establishing the Islamic 
Caliphate.  
 
On the other hand, those regime-opponents did not react, neither positively nor 
negatively, to the Helwan incident. Most of the tweets on the incident came from regular citizens 
who condemned the attack that targeted a church in Christmas time, while applauding the 
bravery of the citizens who stopped the terrorist. The few tweets from regime-opponents accused 
the police of staging the attack still without mentioning the purpose.   
 
It is very noticeable that anti-regime Facebook pages had little interest to terrorism so that 
BenhazaryaSawiris, and Anti-Ikhwan had zero posts on the issue, while the Socialist 
Revolutionists page had only one relevant post and the 6th of April just five posts.  
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On the other hand, pro-regime Facebook pages, especially Anti-Ikhwan and the One Hundred 
Million Campaign against Baradei, almost had daily posts on terrorism which indicates a big 
attention to the issue.  
 
AsefYaRayes page only focused on stating Mubarak's achievements without commenting 
on any current public events, and there is no indication whether it supports or opposes the current 
regime. Thus, there was no post on both studied topics. 
 
As for GERD, most pages – regardless of their tendencies – did not tackle the issue, 
except for the One Hundred Million Campaign against Baradei which had contributed the most 
to the sample (81.5%) followed by Anti Ikhwan (12.3%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
Limitations of the Study: 
- The study only includes nine political Facebook pages, the online versions of three 
publications, and twitter hashtags of three major terror incidents. There are other pages, 
publications, and relevant hashtags.  
- The study is limited to a seven months time frame, while terrorism and GERD crises have 
been going on for years and may continue for long as well. 
- The use of internet and social media is limited to certain social segments so that the study 
does not help understanding how messages directed to other social segments counting 
only on mainstream mediaare framed.  
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Recommendations for Future Research:  
- Further research can replicate the study on similar research populations in the Arab 
World tackling terrorism and any other external threats conducting a comparative 
analysis between both studies. 
- Another replication examining other matters of national interests in Egypt such as 
economic reforms and human development can take place.   
- The study can be used by decision makers to understand the public opinion on terrorism 
and GERD crises, which would serve in enhancing communication over both matters.  
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Facebook Pages 
 
1) Campaign against Baradei 
2) Asefyarayes 
3) Electronic army 
4) BenhazaryaSawiris 
5) 6th of April Movement 
6) Ikhwan online 
7) Anti-Ikhwan 
8) Nation guardians 
9) Socialist Revolutionists  
Publication 
 
1) Ahram 
2) El Masry El Youm 
3) El Wafd 
Twitter Hashtags 
 
1) Rawda Mosque 
2) Wahat Incident 
3) Helwan 
Mention of Election 
 
1) Yes 
2) No  
Frame type: 
 
1) Conflict 
2) Emotional aspect 
3) Grim consequences 
4) Responsibility 
5) Problem definition 
6) Causal interpretation 
7) Moral Evaluation 
8) Solutions 
Causes of terrorism: 
 
0) Not mentioned  
1) Poverty and ignorance 
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2) Religious extremism 
3) Conspiracy by enemy states 
4) Political Conflict 
Factors contributing to GERD crisis: 
 
0) Not mentioned 
1) Ethiopia's need for electricity 
2) Conspiracy by enemy states 
3) Both 
Consequences of terrorism: 
 
0) Not mentioned 
1) Socio-political 
2) Economic  
3) Both  
Stereotypical Frames: 
 
Accusations of treason against the other group: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Accusations of ignorance against the other group: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Accusations of treason against the regime: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Accusations of regime's failure: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Statements of regime's achievements: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
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Rumors: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Themes of Rumors: 
 
1) Intergroup hostility 
2) Mistrust toward the regime 
3) Support to the regime  
Rumors Type:  
 
1) Pipedream (rumors aboutwished-for outcomes) 
2) Bogie (rumors about dreadful consequences) 
3) Wedge-driving (group divisive rumors with aggression) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
